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Many analysts believe that adverse climate
changes in the form of global warming are—
or soon will be—under way as the result of
anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases.
(See the box entitled “What Is Global Warm-
ing?”) The largest such source of these gases is
carbon dioxide (CO2) resulting from the grow-
ing consumption of fossil fuels (petroleum
products, natural gas, and coal).
1 Consequently,
the conservation of fossil fuels figures promi-
nently in strategies to reduce CO2 emissions.
Increasing concerns about the extent of
global warming and its potential consequences
culminated in a United Nations conference in
Kyoto, Japan, in late 1997. Prior to the confer-
ence, President Clinton proposed that the
United States join with other industrialized
countries in setting a target for reducing CO2
emissions in each country to 1990 levels by
2010. By the end of the conference, emissaries
from the industrialized countries had agreed to
a target 7 percent below 1990 levels by 2010
and to make further reductions in subsequent
years. Developing countries would be expected
to reduce their CO2 emissions in future years as
their incomes rise.
As shown in Figure 1, the U.S. Department
of Energy has projected that CO2 emissions from
the consumption of fossil fuels in the industrial-
ized countries will have increased about 30 per-
cent from 1990 to 2010. Therefore, compliance
with the Kyoto accord would represent a sizable
reduction in the use of fossil fuels from what
could otherwise be expected. My analysis indi-
cates that the developing countries would con-
sume nearly 12 percent of the amount of fossil
fuels the industrialized countries must conserve
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would be to slow the growth of global CO2
emissions from the projected 45 percent to 30
percent between 1990 and 2010.
2 Some worry
that compliance with the Kyoto accord would
impose drastic costs on the industrialized coun-
tries with little proven benefit. Others worry the
Kyoto targets are too modest to prevent costly
environmental problems.
These concerns raise several questions.
What is the rationale for government interven-
tion in markets to reduce CO2 emissions? By
how much does economic analysis suggest that
the United States reduce its CO2 emissions, and
how do President Clinton’s proposal and the
Kyoto accord compare with what is optimal?
The former question can be answered with 
simple economic theory. The latter question can
be answered by combining estimates of the 
economic benefits of reducing CO2 emissions
with the opportunity costs of doing so.
CALL FOR GOVERNMENT POLICY
Although nature contributes its own CO2
to the atmosphere, policy is more easily
directed to the CO2 contributed by human activ-
ity. The principal way people contribute to
atmospheric CO2 is through the consumption of
carbon-based fuels. These fuels include petro-
leum products, natural gas, coal, and wood.
Jointly, the first three are often identified as 
“fossil fuels.”
Deforestation is another way people con-
tribute to increased levels of atmospheric CO2.
Scientists estimate that the world’s forests re-
move about one-third of the current CO2 emis-
sions from fossil fuels. Thus, large reductions in
the world’s forests could significantly affect the
atmospheric levels of CO2. Nevertheless, recent
changes in the earth’s forests have had little
effect on atmospheric CO2 in comparison with
the effects from fossil fuel consumption.
At the pragmatic level, the call for govern-
ment action on global warming comes from the
concern that rising consumption of carbon-
based fuels will increase levels of atmospheric
CO2, which will lead to warmer temperatures
that could harm the environment. At a more
analytical level, however, when consumers act
individually they lack an incentive to consider
the global side effects resulting from their con-
sumption of carbon-based fuels. Taken collec-
tively, individual actions could be contributing
to greater emissions of CO2 than are desirable
from the perspective of economic efficiency.
To some extent, the divergence between
individual and global interests can be seen in
the debates that occurred at the UN conference
on global warming. The representatives of each
country jockeyed for advantage and criticized
each other for not doing enough. At the inter-
national level, debate has been exacerbated by
the fact that reducing energy consumption on a
global scale yields gains in the terms of trade for
energy-importing countries.
EVALUATING GLOBAL WARMING POLICY: 
A COST–BENEFIT APPROACH
Economics offers two approaches for eval-
uating how much effort should be put forth to
reduce global warming. One approach is to 
set an appropriate tax on carbon-based fuels.
Another is to use cost–benefit analysis.
The cost–benefit approach offers two
advantages. It allows us to consider more
directly the uncertainty about the benefits of
reducing CO2 emissions. It also allows repre-
sentation of the wide range of debate about
global warming policy. Under this approach, a
reduction in environmental harm is the benefit
of reducing CO2 emissions. The foregone eco-
nomic opportunities from using less fossil fuel
are the cost.
Benefits of Reducing CO2 Emissions
The benefits of reducing CO2 emissions
are the environmental damages that are avoided
by preventing rising concentrations of atmos-
pheric CO2 that intensify the greenhouse effect
and boost global temperatures. Potential envi-
ronmental damage from global warming
includes a variety of effects, from the impact on
What Is Global Warming?
Global warming is a scientific theory or scenario in which increased levels of
atmospheric CO2 are linked to generally rising temperatures around the world.To
better understand global warming, start with the greenhouse effect. Sunlight heats
the earth, but the earth would be far cooler if not for the presence of water vapor and
greenhouse gases in the atmosphere.These gases let sunlight through to warm the
earth but trap some of the heat escaping back into space in the form of infrared radi-
ation. In this manner, the gases act like the glass walls and ceiling of a greenhouse.
Increasing the level of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere is like using thicker
glass in the greenhouse: less heat escapes. Many scientists believe the CO2 re-
leased by human activities is intensifying the greenhouse effect and contributing to 
an increase in the earth’s overall temperature.This general increase in the earth’s
temperature is commonly known as global warming.
Many scientists and other people are concerned about global warming’s poten-
tial effect on the environment. Among the predicted consequences are increased
rainfall, melting polar ice caps, rising ocean levels, increased flooding, and wide-
spread crop failure.
The evidence of global warming is inconclusive, but most scientists who study
the issue think that it is occurring to some degree. Nevertheless, there is consider-
able uncertainty about the magnitude of the change, whether CO2 is a contributing
factor, and the environmental consequences.28
agriculture and forests to the costs of coping
with more severe weather, flooding of coastal
property, and increased disease.
An emerging literature attempts to evalu-
ate the economic costs associated with the
potential environmental damage caused by CO2
emissions. (For examples, see Fankhauser 1994;
Hope and Maul 1996; Nordhaus 1991a, 1991b,
1992, 1993; and Peck and Teisberg 1993a,
1993b.) Analysts and researchers working in the
field must contend with several uncertainties:
the extent to which these emissions will affect
global warming, the environmental harm caused
by global warming, and the economic costs of
those environmental effects.
The emerging literature provides estimates
of the benefits of reducing CO2 emissions. This
literature suggests the worldwide marginal bene-
fit from a reduction in CO2 emissions occurring
in 2010 plausibly ranges from $0 to $33.75 (in
1995 dollars) per barrel of oil equivalent. (In this
case, barrel of oil equivalent refers to the CO2
emissions resulting from the consumption of a
barrel of oil.) The literature also suggests that
the most likely range for worldwide benefits is
about $.92 to $6.61 per barrel of oil equivalent,
as is shown in Figure 2. The mean estimate is
$2.86 per barrel of oil equivalent.
3
Given the considerable uncertainty about
the benefits of reducing CO2 emissions, some
analysts have suggested that making the reduc-
tions is similar to insurance in one important
respect: the costs of reducing emissions are
fairly well known, but the benefits cannot be
known with any certainty.
Estimating the Costs of Reducing CO2 Emissions
Completing the cost–benefit analysis
requires estimates of the costs of reducing CO2
emissions through conservation of fossil fuels.
Following several previous studies, marginal
cost estimates are obtained by using a welfare-
theoretic framework built on top of a simulation
model of world energy markets.
4 Many analysts
use U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) projec-
tions as a reference standard for analysis, and
the simulation model is calibrated to reproduce
the DOE’s 1997 projections for world energy
market conditions in 2010, as shown in Table 1.
The data in the table represent one of many
possible world energy outlooks for 2010.
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Table 1 also summarizes representative
estimates of the long-run supply and demand
responses to prices for the major regional areas
in the analysis. These estimates are derived from
a variety of sources. The oil price elasticities of
supply and demand are based on an Energy
Table 1
Reference Case Quantities, Prices, and Elasticities
Price elasticity of fuel at left
Quantity with respect to price of
(10
15 Btu) Oil Natural gas Coal Other
United States
Consumption
Oil 42.5 –.72 .25 .03 .06
Natural gas 29.2 .25 –.72 .10 .06
Coal 22.8 .12 .63 –.96 .06
Other 14.2 .05 .05 .10 –.50
Production
Oil 17.9 .51





Oil 58.8 –.72 .25 .03 .10
Natural gas 34.2 .25 –.72 .10 .10
Coal 18.1 .12 .63 –.96 .10
Other 29.1 .05 .05 .10 –.50
Production
Oil 25.7 .43





Oil 17.8 –.225 .075 .01 .05
Natural gas 33.2 .075 –.225 .04 .05
Coal 13.1 .04 .20 –.31 .05
Other 6.5 .02 .04 .04 –.25
Production
Oil 20.4 .30





Oil 11.3 –.72 .25 .00 .01
Natural gas 5.6 .25 –.72 .00 .01
Coal .3 .12 .63 –.96 .10
Other .4 .05 .10 .10 –.50
Production
Oil 72.6 *





Oil 64.5 –.45 .15 .02 .08
Natural gas 26.8 .15 –.45 .10 .08
Coal 68.5 .08 .40 –.61 .08
Other 17.0 .04 .08 .08 –.50
Production
Oil 58.3 .43
Natural gas 31.0 .43
Coal 64.7 1.86
Other 17.0 1.00
World reference prices $/10
6 Btu† $/standard unit†
Oil $3.519 $20.41 per barrel
Natural gas $1.9553 $2.01 per Mcf
Coal $ .7924 $16.919 per short ton
* OPEC adjusts its production to maintain a constant share of the oil market.
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Modeling Forum study (1991) that compares 
ten major world oil market models.
6 Elastici-
ties for other fuels are calibrated to estimates
adapted from Bohi (1981) and Brown and Yücel
(1995).
Following Brown and Huntington (1998),
the responses for the region that encompasses
China, Eastern Europe, and the former Soviet
Union (C/EE/FSU) are judgmental. The produc-
tion and consumption decisions in these coun-
tries are more likely to be influenced by the
forces of economic transition than by changes
in world energy prices. In fact, if the supply and
demand responses for the C/EE/FSU were made
comparable to responses for other country
groups, the conservation scenarios considered
here would reduce world energy prices enough
that the model would predict these economies
would import significant quantities of energy.
The author considers such a result untenable
and therefore assumes a smaller response to
price than for other countries. To the extent that
these countries are more sensitive in their re-
sponse to price, the estimated costs of achieving
various world conservation targets without
cooperation from these countries would be
larger than reported here, but the thrust of the
current analysis would be unchanged.
The response of oil producers within OPEC
is highly uncertain. To date, formal modeling of
OPEC decisions has been far from reliable.
OPEC appears to operate like an imperfect car-
tel at some times but not at others. The OPEC
countries appear to be about as uncomfortable
with a rapidly increasing market share (such as
accompanied the relatively low prices of the
1960s) as they are with a rapidly decreasing
market share (such as occurred in the aftermath
of the price hikes of the late 1970s and early
1980s). The analysis presented here assumes
that OPEC acts to maintain a constant market
share.
7
Cost estimates are obtained by computing
the welfare costs of policies under which the
United States works in concert with other coun-
tries in the Organization for Economic Coopera-
tion and Development (OECD) to reduce global
CO2 emissions through fossil fuel conservation.
The modeling framework allows world energy
prices to adjust to the conservation of fossil
energy to restore a balance between supply and
demand conditions in each market. Analytically,
carbon taxes are used to reduce the consump-
tion of fossil fuels in the two country groups.
The tax approach assumes that conservation
measures are applied across all end uses.
Values from these simulations are used
with equations in the appendix to construct
marginal cost curves for U.S. abatement of CO2
emissions. This methodology follows the wel-
fare-theoretic approach previously employed by
Brown and Huntington (1994a, 1994b, 1998)
and Felder and Rutherford (1993). The resulting
cost curves take into account a number of 
factors, including the direct welfare costs of 
U.S. conservation efforts, transfers of wealth
Figure 2
Estimated Costs and Benefits of CO2 Abatement
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between countries, the effect lower energy
prices would have in stimulating energy con-
sumption in nonparticipating countries, and the
economic cost of OPEC cartelization.
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Costs of Reducing CO2 Emissions
The first marginal cost curve, which is
labeled “Marginal cost—world,” is shown in
Figure 2. This curve represents the marginal
costs to the world of the U.S. fossil fuel conser-
vation necessary to reduce CO2 emissions. Eco-
nomic well-being is maximized at the level of
CO2 abatement where the marginal cost equals
the marginal benefit. The risk-neutral approach
would be to equate marginal cost to the mean
estimate of marginal benefit. As shown in Figure
2, estimated marginal cost equals the mean esti-
mate of marginal benefit at 65 metric tons of
CO2 abatement.
An extreme precautionary approach to
avoiding the risk of global warming suggests
using the upper bound estimate of the likely
range as the measure of marginal benefit. As
shown in Figure 2, marginal cost equals this
upper bound at just under 200 metric tons of
CO2 abatement.
In comparison, President Clinton’s pro-
posal to reduce U.S. emissions to 1990 levels 
by 2010 implies 384 metric tons of CO2 abate-
ment, a figure substantially higher than what 
is optimal under either measure of marginal
benefit. At this level of CO2 abatement, the 
marginal cost is more than $16 per barrel of 
oil equivalent, substantially more than the mean
estimate of marginal benefit of $2.86 per barrel
of oil equivalent or the likely upper bound esti-
mate of $6.61 per barrel of oil equivalent.
Compliance with the Kyoto accord would
seem to imply 478 metric tons of CO2 abatement
in 2010 from fossil fuel conservation, at a mar-
ginal cost of nearly $25 per barrel of oil equiv-
alent. U.S. officials expect to use offsets and
other credits, however, to reduce the burden
from conservation of fossil fuels to 3 percent
below 1990 levels. That implies 424 metric tons
of CO2 abatement from the conservation of fos-
sil fuels, at a marginal cost of just under $20 per
barrel of oil equivalent.
Improved Terms of Trade
Because the United States imports oil and
natural gas, it can improve its terms of trade by
conserving those fuels. The improved terms of
trade mean that the United States incurs lower
costs for its actions to reduce CO2 emissions
than the world incurs from the U.S. actions. As
shown by the curve labeled “Marginal cost—
U.S.” in Figure 3, the lower marginal cost
implies that a greater reduction in CO2 emis-
sions is optimal.
Such a conclusion is flawed, however.
Optimality cannot be found by equating the
marginal benefit to the world to the marginal
cost to the United States. Sound analysis
requires consistency in defining the incidence of
costs and benefits.
Figure 3
Estimated Costs and Benefits of CO2 Abatement
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Free Lunch: There Is No Such Thing
A number of energy analysts argue that
the United States can cut its energy consump-
tion by 25 percent and achieve a cost savings at
the same time. As shown by the curve labeled
“Free lunch” in Figure 3, President Clinton’s tar-
get for reducing CO2 emissions would be very
close to optimal if the free-lunch cost curve rep-
resented reality. In fact, some analysts who con-
sider this cost curve accurate and also favor the
extreme precautionary approach to reducing
CO2 emissions have criticized the president’s
target as too conservative. As shown in Figure 3,
achieving the target of reducing CO2 emissions
from fossil fuels 3 percent below 1990 levels
would have a marginal cost that is above the
mean estimate of marginal benefit but below
the likely upper bound.
Analysts who believe in the free lunch use
conceptually flawed studies to support their
claims. What these analysts are unable to ex-
plain is why a free market would leave such
cost savings on the table. Instead, they offer
vague explanations of market barriers, including
inappropriate lifestyle choices, and demand
government regulation to reduce what they see
as wasteful use of energy (see Brown 1996).
Hidden Costs of Policy
Economic policy often carries with it hid-
den costs that are not captured by traditional
welfare-theoretic measures. Regulatory ineffi-
ciency is one way in which costs can escalate.
When regulation is used instead of broad mar-
ket incentives, such as taxes, the lowest cost
methods of energy conservation can be ignored.
Interference in free trade is another way
policies to reduce CO2 emissions can have hid-
den costs. Broad programs of energy conserva-
tion permit energy-importing countries to
improve their terms of trade with energy-
exporting countries—a fact that has not been
lost on OPEC. The countries that are the most
dependent on imported energy have been the
most aggressive in promoting global coopera-
tion to reduce CO2 emissions. More self-suffi-
cient countries, such as the United States, have
been more reluctant to participate. Within the
United States, energy conservation has a
decided tilt toward the conservation of oil, the
fuel for which we are most import-dependent.
Rent-seeking behavior is another way in
which policy can have hidden costs. Changes in
policy create winners and losers. Both groups
have an incentive to expend real resources 
to achieve their objectives by influencing the
political process, which can add sizable costs to
policy.
Using an approach first suggested by
Tullock (1967), the author estimates the poten-
tial hidden costs of policy. As shown in Figure
4, these costs can be sizable. With the hidden
costs incorporated, the marginal cost of reduc-
ing U.S. CO2 emissions is more than $30 per
barrel of oil equivalent at zero abatement and
more than $80 at full compliance with the Kyoto
Figure 4
Estimated Costs and Benefits of CO2 Abatement
1995 dollars per barrel of oil equivalent
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Marginal cost—world
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accord. If the potential for hidden costs were
taken seriously, the cost of reducing CO2 emis-
sions would greatly outweigh its benefits.
CONCLUSIONS
Global warming is a theory partially sup-
ported by the facts. More evidence is needed to
definitively conclude that the rising atmospheric
level of CO2 resulting from the use of carbon-
based fuels is causing global warming. Never-
theless, most scientists who study the issue
think that the use of fossil fuels is contributing
at least some of the global warming that
appears to be occurring. Despite this seeming
consensus, there is considerable uncertainty
about both the magnitude and the environmen-
tal consequences of global warming.
Given these uncertainties, reducing CO2
emissions is like insurance against global warm-
ing and its possible environmental conse-
quences. Under most current proposals, the
developed nations would buy all or most of the
insurance. Developing nations would be asked
to contribute once they attain higher levels of
income. Cost–benefit analysis suggests that
reducing U.S. emissions of CO2 to comply with
the Kyoto accord or to reach the more modest
target proposed by President Clinton represents
too much insurance. Analysis for the other
OECD countries yields a similar result. It is not
surprising, therefore, that little headway has
been made in ratifying the accord.
NOTES
The author would like to thank Frank Berger, Sterling
Burnett, Mike Canes, Roger Hemminghaus, Hill
Huntington, Don Norman, Steve Prowse, Cece Smith,
Ron Sutherland, Lori Taylor, Mine Yücel, and Carlos
Zarazaga for helpful comments and discussions with-
out implicating them in the conclusions.
1 For a comprehensive treatment of emissions other than
CO2, see Hall (1990, 1992).
2 The Department of Energy projection that world CO2
emissions from fossil fuels would increase about 45
percent from 1990 to 2010 owes greatly to expecta-
tions of accelerating growth and industrialization in
developing areas of the world.
3 These estimates of damage are adapted from Brown
and Huntington (1998). Previous analysis suggests a
flat marginal damage curve. Summarizing the previous
literature, Peck and Teisberg (1992) explain that mar-
ginal damage costs are essentially unaffected by the
emissions levels in any given decade. This conclusion
rests on the finding that temperature change depends
on gas concentration, which is not greatly affected by
emissions levels in any given decade. I follow this
characterization by assuming horizontal damage
curves that depict a constant level of benefits for any
level of CO2 abatement.
4 The author developed the analytical framework with
Hillard G. Huntington of Stanford University.
5 The projected energy-demand conditions depend on a
variety of assumptions about economic growth and the
extent of energy-saving technological change in the
absence of price change. The supply conditions other
than OPEC oil production incorporate assumptions
about the resource base, engineering constraints on
developing resources, and producer-country taxes
and policies. In these projections, OPEC members 
satisfy the excess demand but adjust the next period’s
price in response to market tightness.
6 See Huntington (1992, 1993).
7 Griffin (1985) and Dahl and Yücel (1991) provide
empirical estimates of OPEC behavior that are broadly
consistent with this view.
8 My analysis abstracts from a number of considerations
featured in other studies of energy conservation. Hoel
(1991a) and Newberry (1992) consider the effects of
other taxes and redistributive policies. Bohm (1993);
Brown and Huntington (1994b); Eyckmans, Proost, and
Schokkaert (1993); Hoel (1991b and 1994); Manne
Aggregate Economic Consequences for the United States
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political pressure on fiscal and monetary authorities to offset the slowdown.Yielding
to that pressure could lead to higher inflation.
As shown in Figure B.1, the effect on aggregate economic activity depends 
on the amount of CO2 abatement.The amount of energy conservation required to
reduce 2010 CO2 emissions to the 1990 level would imply that U.S. GDP would be
2.7 to 3.7 percent lower in 2010 than it would otherwise be.* Assuming the United
States could use offsets and credits, compliance with the Kyoto accord would imply
that U.S. GDP would be 3 to 4.3 percent lower in 2010.These estimates imply that if
the United States embarked on a ten-year program to achieve compliance with the
Kyoto accord, U.S. GDP growth would be 0.3 to 0.4 percent lower per year.
* GDP loss estimates are obtained through elasticities that relate energy prices to aggregate
economic activity.The elasticities were chosen to represent the range of estimates from a 
number of prominent economic studies.
Figure B.1
U.S. CO2 Abatement and GDP Losses
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and Rutherford (1994); Welsch (1995); and Whalley
and Wigle (1991) consider alternative policies for dis-
tributing conservation goals across countries and
gains from cooperation. Felder and Rutherford (1993)
and Pezzey (1992) allow for different types of goods.
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Some Analytics of CO2 Abatement
A welfare-theoretic approach can be used to
derive formulas for the marginal cost of CO2 abate-
ment achieved through the conservation of carbon-
based energy. For any country (or country grouping),
the economic welfare obtained from the market for
a particular source of energy is the sum of con-
sumer and producer surpluses:
In the above equation, Wij denotes the economic
welfare country i obtains from the market for
energy source j, QDij the quantity of primary
energy j demanded in country i, PDij country i’s
demand price for energy source j (the market’s
marginal valuation of consumption excluding exter-
nalities) at each quantity (Qj), Pij the market price
of energy source j in country i, QSij the quantity of
energy j produced in country i, and PSij the domes-
tic supply price of energy source j in country i
(marginal cost of its oil production excluding exter-
nalities) at each quantity (Qj).
Cost of Gross CO2 Abatement
The most direct measure of the cost of reduc-
ing CO2 emissions is the welfare losses occurring
in the energy markets that result from altering
energy consumption to reduce emissions. Assum-
ing no other distortions in domestic energy markets
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and no significant international trade in nonfossil
energy, summing over the marginal effects of the
emissions reduction policy on each fossil energy
source yields the marginal cost of compliance for
country i:
In the above equation, MCi denotes the gross mar-
ginal cost of reducing CO2 emissions through the
conservation of carbon energy sources, PWj the
world price of energy source j, QCij the quantity of
energy source j that is conserved (where ¶QCij =
–¶QDij), QMij country i’s imports of energy source j,
and Ei is the reduction in country i’s emissions
under the policy whose costs are being estimated.
As Equation A.2 shows, the gross marginal cost of
reducing emissions is the difference between the
domestic and world prices of each carbon energy
source (PDij – Pij) weighted by the shares of each
fuel conserved for a one-unit reduction in CO2
emissions, minus (plus) the transfers obtained
(lost) by reducing the price of imported (exported)
carbon energy, noting that ¶PWj/¶Ei is negative.
Cost of Net CO2 Abatement
The net effect of the CO2 abatement actions
taken by a country or group of countries is the
quantity of their abatement minus the induced
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change in CO2 emissions in the rest of the world.
The change in CO2 emissions in nonparticipating
countries depends on how their consumption of
fossil energy is affected by a change in world
energy prices and how the conservation actions in
the participating countries affect the world oil price.
Therefore, the relationship between a change in
participant CO2 emissions and the net change in
world CO2 emissions can be expressed as
In the above equation, EW denotes the amount by
which world CO2 emissions are reduced, Ej the
CO2 emissions associated with consuming one unit
of carbon energy j, and QDXj the quantity of carbon
energy j consumed by nonparticipating countries.
Following Felder and Rutherford (1993) and
Brown and Huntington (1994a, 1998), Equations
A.2 and A.3 can be combined to express the 
marginal cost of the net world reduction in CO2
emissions for country (or country grouping) i.
Specifically, multiplying the marginal cost of the
gross reduction in CO2 emissions for country i by
the net change in world CO2 emissions resulting
from country i reducing its CO2 emissions yields
In the above equation, MCWi denotes the net mar-
ginal cost to country i of its actions to reduce world
CO2 emissions.
As Equation A.4 shows, the effect fossil
energy conservation has on the cost of energy im-
ports and on nonparticipant consumption of carbon
energy are related through the effect conservation
has on the world prices for these fuels. As cooper-
ative conservation lowers the world prices of fossil
energy, it reduces the cost of country i’s energy
imports and increases nonparticipant fossil energy
consumption. If conservation has no effect on
world energy prices, however, the energy-importing
countries will not obtain terms-of-trade advantages,
and fossil energy consumption will not be stimu-






















































































From the world perspective, the cost of reduc-
ing CO2 emissions through fossil energy conserva-
tion is the sum of costs borne by each country.
From this perspective, net transfers cancel to zero.
For every country or group of countries that obtains
transfers from reduced prices for carbon energy,
another country or group of countries yields an off-
setting transfer, and Mij(¶PWj/¶Ei) is exactly offset.
Accounting for the offsetting transfers, as well
as the distortion in world oil markets resulting from
OPEC holding its oil production below free market
levels, alters Equation A.4 to yield
In the above equation, MCWi denotes the net mar-
ginal cost to the world of country i’s actions to
reduce emissions, QCi1 the amount of oil con-
served, SO1 OPEC’s share of world oil production,
and CO1 OPEC’s cost of oil production.
Hidden Costs
Tullock (1967) argues that economic agents
have the incentive to expend real resources to
influence economic policy up to the total value of
the transfers that might result from the policy. In
doing so they would dissipate the total value of the
potential transfers as costs. Incorporating these
hidden costs into the analysis alters Equation A.5
to yield
In the above equation, MCHi denotes the net mar-
ginal cost to the world, inclusive of hidden costs, of
country i’s actions to reduce emissions. Note that
QDij is the consumption of fuel j in country i.
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